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On a So-called Demonstration of the Causal Power of Absences  
David S. Oderberg 
 
Abstract 
Tyron Goldschmidt has recently published a non-paper in which he claims to demonstrate the 
causal power of absences. His non-paper is, precisely, an empty page. The non-paper is 
ingenious and at first ‘glance’ the ‘reader’ might think that the absence of words on the page 
does prove that negative beings can literally cause states such as surprise or disappointment. 
Closer analysis, however, shows that Goldschmidt’s clever non-paper not only lacks words 
but also lacks causal power. Serious metaphysical problems pile up if we suppose otherwise.  
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Tyron Goldschmidt has recently not written what is, to my mind, the best non-paper 
I have not read in decades.1 In it he purports to demonstrate, albeit without saying so in the 
paper, that absences have causal power, something many reality-minded metaphysicians 
vigorously deny.2 His non-paper, in other words, consists of no words whatsoever – a mere 
empty page. True, he does have metaphysicians on his side,3 but in this case the absence of a 
                                                 
1 ‘A Demonstration of the Causal Power of Absences’, Dialectica 70 (2016): 85. 
2 See, for example, George Molnar, ‘Truthmakers for Negative Truths’, Australasian Journal 
of Philosophy 78 (2000): 72-86; David Lewis, ‘Causation as Influence’, in J. Collins, N. Hall, 
and L. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford 
Books, 2004), 75-106; Helen Beebee, ‘Causing and Nothingness’, in  Causation and 
Counterfactuals, 291-308. 
3 See, for example, Stephen Barker and Mark Jago, ‘Being Positive about Negative Facts’, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2012): 117-38; D. H. Mellor, The Facts of 
Causation (London: Routledge: 1995). 
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good many of them indicates no lack of a sound ontological sense – not so much a taste for 
desert landscapes, à la Quine, but more a preference for oases over mirages. 
To grasp the full force of my response to Goldschmidt, however, each reader must 
not read his ingenious contribution for himself. Each reader must, in the spirit of Hume, turn 
their gaze within and inspect their own personal reaction to Goldschmidt’s powerful 
challenge. I do not want to bias the reader with a report of the result of my own inward turn. 
You must, I insist, first do the opposite of what St Augustine tells us God commanded him to 
do. Rather than take Goldschmidt’s paper and read it, I command you to take Goldschmidt’s 
paper and not read it. 
So, have you not read it? Good. I will first report my unconsidered reaction. Then I 
will report my considered reaction and you will, I trust, see that these are your reactions too, 
once you impress some sound reasoning upon Goldschmidt’s tabula rasa. In temporal order, 
I initially reacted thus. (1) How annoying, I’ve only downloaded the cover sheet of the paper. 
I must download it again. (2) How incredibly annoying, I’ve still only downloaded the cover 
sheet! (3) No, I haven’t done anything wrong; my computer is not playing up; my internet 
connection is fine. So the publisher has made a mistake and not posted Goldschmidt’s entire 
paper. (4) But at the top of the page the paper is reported as being only one page long! (5) 
Oh, I get it. But wait! Goldschmidt has done it! By Heaven, the lack of text has really – really 
– surprised me. I’ve been metaphysically smacked in the face by, of all things, an absence! 
Needless to say, Goldschmidt achieved, at least with me, his intended effect in a way 
that no philosophy paper I have ever not read has ever done – at least so quickly. A 
psychological effect does not, however, a piece of philosophical reasoning make. We 
philosophers are not lacking in vulnerability to intellectual sleights of hand. Fortunately, 
having been thinking about this topic for quite a while, and not allowing myself to mistake 
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(1)-(5) above as containing any kind of rational persuasion, I feel on solid ground in 
objecting that Goldschmidt has not in the least made out his case for absence causation. 
Why not? Well, it is hard to deny that I was struck by something. I was really caused 
to be surprised. So what surprised me? Was it the negative being constituted by an absence of 
text on the page (apart from the title, author, and a few sundries)? Note that there was much 
that was absent from the page – not only text but also splotches of ink, pictures of daffodils, 
the names of other philosophers, et cetera and probably ad infinitum. After all, if, as 
Goldschmidt believes, absences have causal power, then they must be both real and capable 
of individuation, so he cannot deny that all these other absences exist – those, to be precise, 
that are absences from his non-paper. So I should have been surprised by all these other 
absences as well, shouldn’t I? 
Not at all, comes the reply: for you were not expecting there to be pictures of 
daffodils or splotches of ink. True, but what was I expecting? Suppose Goldschmidt’s non-
paper had contained only the text of the first page of War and Peace. Then it would still have 
been a non-paper, only in a different way. I would still have been surprised, but for a 
different reason. In the first case I expected some text; there wasn’t any; and I was surprised. 
In the second case I also expected text, and I got it; no surprise there. But I also expected 
philosophical text, not a page of Tolstoy; and so I was surprised by that. By what – by the 
lack of philosophical text? Well, Goldschmidt’s actual non-paper also lacks philosophical 
text, and the absence of text is not identical to the absence of philosophical text. So why was 
I not surprised by the lack of philosophical text in his actual non-paper? Why no causal 
‘oomph’ (or ‘biff’4) both from the lack of text and from the distinct lack of philosophical 
text? Will Goldschmidt say that I did not expect philosophical text, only text? How wrong he 
                                                 
4 David Lewis (using Peter Menzies’s term), ‘Void and Object’, in Causation and 
Counterfactuals, 277-90. 
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would be, for I can only avow that I did expect both from his actual non-paper. So why didn’t 
they both surprise me? Again, I can only report that what surprised me was the lack of any 
text. To be sure, had there been a page of Tolstoy I then would have been surprised by the 
lack of philosophical text, but Goldschmidt’s actual non-paper is not like that. I suspect that if 
he had published a page of Tolstoy, under the same title as his actual non-paper, the surprise 
generated would have been different. 
This instance of the ‘problem of profligate causation’, as it is called,5 is a hard nut to 
crack. Goldschmidt might insist that the absence of text from his non-paper, and the absence 
of philosophical text, are one and the same absence in this world. True, you can have one 
without the other in some possible world, but in the actual world, as far as his actual non-
paper is concerned, they are identical. I find this move dubious: after all, the non-paper also 
lacked legible text, and I expected legible text, but was decidedly not surprised by its 
absence. So what is the single, causally operative absence Goldschmidt could have in mind if 
he made such a move – the lack of black, legible, justified, first-line indented, evenly spaced 
prose? (Just go through that journal’s style guidelines: to be frank, I expected a decent 
amount of these to characterise the text I expected.) I’m having trouble identifying the 
absence itself, let alone knowing whether it literally struck my mind, thereby generating 
surprise. 
Yet suppose we have pinned down the absence. Since not all of its components 
struck me (such as the lack of legibility – although I expected it, I tell you!) – in fact only one 
component did, namely the lack of text – in virtue of what is it the case that this component 
did surprise me and the others did not? What move could Goldschmidt make now? Perhaps 
rank the expectations in order of strength? He might say that I was only surprised by 
whatever I expected most of all, which was just text. This looks gratuitous. Assuming we 
                                                 
5 Peter Menzies, ‘Difference-Making in Context’, in Causation and Counterfactuals, 139-80. 
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could even rank the levels of strength of my relevant expectations (what a task...), why 
shouldn’t I have been struck by the lack of the two features I expected the most, say both text 
and philosophical text, or the top three (add, say, paragraph spacing or some such)... What 
remotely plausible principle could be at work here? 
Now Goldschmidt might change tack. I am mistaken, he might argue, in thinking 
that it is causal ‘oomph’ he is pointing to. No, he might insist, it is another theory of absence 
causation he is defending, such as a Lewisian counterfactual theory (with, let us not forget, 
all of its attendant problems).6 To say that I am caused to be surprised by the lack of text is 
not to say that there is a causal relation at work, only that if there had been text I would not 
have been surprised, and so on. We all know the drill. No, I reply: Professor Goldschmidt, 
you could not get away with that. Is it not causal power you are seeking to defend? The clue 
is in the title of your non-paper! You think absences can be causally operative,7 not merely 
causally relevant8 or causally explanatory.9 We can all agree that absences, whatever they 
are, have a causally relevant, explanatory role: you did not have to go to the inordinate effort 
of not writing your non-paper to convince anyone of that. 
The metaphysical problems are piling up. To add a cherry to the cake, consider now 
my reaction rather than the alleged absence I reacted to. I was, I admit, quite surprised. I 
expected there to be text. But note: I also wanted there to be text, yet I did not feel that my 
desire had been frustrated. I hoped for text, but I did not feel my hopes had been dashed. I 
looked forward to text, but its absence did not make me feel deprived of an intellectually 
enjoyable hour or two reading Professor Goldschmidt’s limpid prose. Heavens above – I 
deserved text! But did I feel cheated by its absence? Not at all! On the contrary, once I got 
                                                 
6 Lewis, ‘Causation as Influence’; ‘Void and Object’. 
7 Contra Molnar, ‘Truthmakers for Negative Truths’. 
8 As per Boris Kusko, ‘The Reality of Absences’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 
(2006): 21-37. 
9 As per Beebee, ‘Causing and Nothingness’. 
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the joke I gave the silent, knowing guffaw that only a smug academic could produce. Oh, by 
the way: I was not expecting, nor did I particularly want, to have an intellectual joke played 
on me, but I laughed all the same. 
Enough. Should it not be obvious what is going on here? Look at all the 
ratiocination that I had to go through at the time, and then post facto as I write this real paper 
in order to work out, as the President of the United States might have put it, what the heck is 
going on. Here is what went on in my head: I saw a sheet of paper (actually a pdf page, but 
let’s talk the old-fashioned way) with a title, author’s name, and some sundries. What 
impinged on my sense organs, causing a certain sensory experience, was a predominantly 
white page with a small amount of information on it. The only ‘oomph’ there could have 
been came from that. It is of no avail to object – which is not true anyway,10 but suppose it 
were – that all seeing is seeing as or seeing that, that one could question whether I even saw 
a page, or saw any text at all as opposed to a patch of white and some smaller black shapes 
overlapping the white. The question is whether the absence of relevant text – the expected 
philosophical text – could have any ‘oomph’ of its own, whether or not the other things I am 
certain I saw also have ‘oomph’. As long as something has ‘oomph’, even if it be just pixels 
or ink marks, we have the required contrast with absences. 
Once the page and the small amount of text on it had caused my sensory experience, 
I was surprised – not by something else I saw, but once I had realised that there was nothing 
else on the page, that the page lacked what I expected to see as well. My question to myself 
was along the lines of, ‘What am I looking at here? The page is blank save for an author and 
title!’ I knew already what I was seeing, but I hadn’t yet worked out why I was startled. ‘Oh, I 
see’, my internal monologue continued – ‘I am surprised because there is no other text’. My 
                                                 
10 There is a world of difference between the question whether one perceives text and 
whether one perceives an absence of text, and also between whether one perceives ink marks 
as text and whether one perceives that a page lacks text at all. 
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‘I see’ was not a realisation that I was seeing an additional being, to wit an absence of text. 
Were I to have seen that, I would have seen it at the same time as I saw the page, author and 
title, with no delay for confusion and head scratching. After all, if the absence were real and 
had ‘oomph’, there is no reason why its ‘oomph’ should have been any less powerful, any 
slower acting, than the ‘oomph’ exercised by the white page with its small amount of text. 
But I did delay. I pondered. I thought I had made a mistake. Then I thought the publisher had 
made a mistake. Then I came to an understanding, in other words, I grasped a truth I had not 
grasped before – that the author was intentionally surprising me in a performative way, by the 
very ‘paper’ itself, and this in virtue of the truth that the ‘paper’ lacked philosophical text and 
was supposed to lack it. 
I defy any reader who has taken a look at Goldschmidt’s non-paper before reading 
this one to avow with all sincerity that they did not go through the same, or a very similar, 
ratiocinative process before realising what was going on. Now we often ratiocinate, of 
course, about what it is we are perceiving. We have to interpret the world around us, whether 
consciously or via unconscious, hard-wired mechanisms. Of itself the need for ratiocination 
proves nothing. I ask the reader, though, to attend to the particular train of thought that 
accompanied their inspection of Goldschmidt’s purported demonstration. Did you just see an 
absence? No, I insist – you did not. You never took yourself to be doing such a thing. You 
saw a page and you saw a bit of text, but you had to work out what that meant as far as 
absences themselves are concerned. After all, the title of the paper, which you did see, 
directed you to just such reflection. Ask yourself: if you saw an absence, why did it take you 
so long to realise that you saw it? Did you have to train yourself to see it? How did that work, 
and why was it even necessary? Or did you, as I contend, come to the realisation, after some 
ratiocination, that there was no text where it should have been? 
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The metaphysical moral we should draw from all this is that we have here no 
demonstration of the causal power of absences. We can account for what we need to account 
for in other, metaphysically palatable ways. We do not need to reduce putative absence 
causation to explanation, or causal relevance, or counterfactual dependence. All of these do 
come into play, but we can also keep well away from the Quinean desert landscape. In fact, 
on the sort of theory I defend, our landscape needs to be far more lush, far more exotic, and 
also far more inviting than anywhere Quine would have felt at home. For we need to 
recognise the existence of potentialities, states of need, normative realities, privations, and 
the full machinery of a neo-Aristotelian theory of being. With that machinery put to work, we 
can find positive truthmakers for negative truths without having to postulate real absences 
with causal powers. We can also account for truths of absence causation by grounding them 
in real causal processes, in actualities with causal powers and attendant potencies. Absences 
are not real beings, on this theory, but they are ‘beings of reason’ as the Scholastics put it – 
what we grasp insofar as we grasp truths in which absences play an ineliminable role.11  
Why all the presumptuous psychologising, you may ask? Well, isn’t Goldschmidt’s 
non-paper just one big exercise in psychology? Isn’t he asking us to turn the gaze within and 
see what he claims he sees? So I turn my gaze within and I do not see nothing as he would 
have it; but I do see nothing of the sort.  
 
 
 
                                                 
11 For the theory undergirding all of this, see my forthcoming book, The Metaphysics of Good 
and Evil. 
